T h e H ungarian economic reform, in troduced in 1968, has been properly considered a m ajor shift from centraliza tion to decentralization, representing perhaps the most radical postwar change in the economic model of any Eastern European country. It is obvious, how ever, that the functioning of a traditional economic system cannot be basically changed from one day to the next: obstacles to the operation of the new model in Hungary had been accumulat ing for about two decades and still exist, both in the economy and the society. T he purpose of this article is to describe some of the difficult aspects of the period of transition.
After having experienced a dynamic period of extensive industrialization, in 1968 Hungary substituted for its strongly centralized model of planned economy a T h e goal of the H ungarian economic reform of 1968 was to accelerate the growth of industrial productivity by providing m anagers w ith more authority in planning and adm inistering the operations of th eir companies. Direct and de tailed instructions by central agencies were re placed by general central regulations. One aim of the new economic model was to encourage better perform ance by workers through the introduction of im proved money incentives. T his objective has not been achieved yet, for work dis cipline and work intensity rem ain loose in m any enterprises. T his article exam ines work perfor mance and incentive plans in three companies in an effort to identify the socioeconomic condi tions and influences responsible for their diffi culties in im proving work perform ance.
Lajos H ethy and Csaba Mak6 are m em bers of the Institute of Sociology, H ungarian Academy of Sciences.-E d i t o r less centralized one, which was some where between the centralized and de centralized extremes. T he change was carried out on the proposition that the m ajor lines of structural development and income distribution sh o u ld be planned by central agencies, but a mar ket system should be created which would perm it decentralized determ ina tion of methods of carrying out the pro gram. T he distribution of disposable income between major occupational and income groups was to be determined by the central agencies; total fixed invest m ent in the economy and the shares to be directed to a few specific growth sec tors and to major areas of social invest m ent were to be decided by the central authorities; but the distribution of the remainder of investment and the dis tribution of income within the central limits would be determined by the eco nomic organizations and by the market.
T he carefully prepared p ro g ra m , aimed at intensive development by ac celerating the growth of industrial pro ductivity, brought increased independ ence for economic organizations; it replaced direct and detailed instructions by central agencies with indirect and comprehensive central regulations, giv ing more power to managers in form ulat ing the strategy of their companies. Thus, the perm anent intervention of central organs was replaced, at least partially, by the orienting role of a somewhat 768 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW liberalized market and by the introduc tion of profit incentives for managers. T he labor market also experienced re laxation of restraints.1
In the previous model the central agencies had the staggering tasks of set ting prices arbitrarily; investigating all production possibilities and determining the package to be chosen; and ensuring that the managers actually followed in structions. This practice greatly pro moted industrialization but seriously impaired efficiency. Since 1968, some prices have continued to be centrally fixed, but others have been limited only in range, while the remainder have been allowed to change market conditions. Managers have been given more author ity in choosing a profit-maximizing pack age from their production-possibility set, although certain aspects of their activities have remained under strict control, such as decisions concerning the level of wages. Profits have been introduced as the most im portant indicator of the efficiency of organizations, and as an incentive for managers, a share of profits has been turned into differential incentive bonus es. Workers, whose movements were strictly limited in the previous model, have had complete freedom to choose jobs for themselves. In short, the new system is intended to give impetus to the initiative of individuals and groups en gaged in production and to free the central agencies from concern with the details of the economy which determine 'In the 1950s the dynam ic process of indus trialization was based on agriculture: it pum ped surplus farm labor into factories and profits accum ulated by farms into industrial invest ments. Industrial growth resulted mostly from the increase in m anpower, w ith only very slight technological progress. C om plem entary invest m ents and m aintenance were neglected. T hen in the 1960s, the reserves of agriculture were exhausted.
neither its structure nor the pace of its general development.
Labor Efficiency T he positive effects of the new model have been felt in the economy; however, at the same time, the serious difficulties in work efficiency, which prevailed under the former model, have continued. Dis cipline in the work place has remained poor, and work intensity continues to be loose in many state-owned companies. Therefore, several attractive theoretical and practical problems have emerged for economists and sociologists to discuss. To what extent can current difficulties in work performance be attributed to the heritage of the previous model in the internal structure and in the general socioeconomic circumstances of economic organizations? More g e n e ra lly , w h at structural obstacles have to be overcome by a new model so that its maximum positive effects may be felt? T o what ex tent are possible contradictions and rigid ities in the new model responsible for the existing difficulties, and what is the relationship of these negative features to the heritage of the past?
Although it is beyond our ken to an swer these questions fully, we have tried to contribute to their clarification by a sociological investigation, which was started in 1968 and has since been com pleted. We have focused our attention on only one target of the new model-the introduction of more efficient money in centives for workers to encourage better performance. In the course of our re search, the progress and the obstacles to realization of this incentive program have been examined in three state-owned engineering companies.2 -This article presents a second analysis of the same topic by the authors. In contrast to the present focus on macro-socioeconomic factors, Objectives and Methods In our investigation we have under taken the following tasks: to judge the relative level of efficiency of the incentive systems (£) at the three companies since 1968; to examine the relationship be tween E and those socioeconomic factors in the internal structure and the outside environment that might have had an effect on the incentive systems at these three companies; and to in v e s tig a te (among the factors of outside environ ment) the role of the central regulations that have come into existence as part of the new economic model.
Our approach to E was in line with scientific management motivation theory. Despite our awareness of its shortcom ings, we have found it a source of inspira tion. O ur standpoint on incentive systems was that an obviously poorly formulated wage plan can never be a success, al though a seemingly perfect incentive sys tem can sometimes be a failure.
In Hungary the practice of the Stakhanovist movement in the 1950s3 and our own investigations carried out in 1969-71 the previous article exam ined m icro factors w ithin one com pany. ITserves as a basis for some statem ents in the present article. See Lajos Hethy and Csaba Mak6, "Obstacles to the Introduction of Efficient Money Incentives in a H ungarian Factory," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1971), pp. 541-553. "T he flagrant injustices in wages and the arbitrarily created privileges, however, resulted in grave conflicts am ong workers and between workers, on one hand, and trade union, party, and m anagem ent on the other. Stakhanovists usually were arbitrarily created "heroes of w ork," often producing their outstanding individual production results w ith the help of several dis guised assistants and by other means, contradict ing fair play. T h e other workers desperatelytried to keep pace with them , b ut of course they were always lagging behind. It m ust be m en tioned th at considerable differences in wTages, w hether fair or unfair, always lead to conflicts which m anagers have to face if they endeavor to make incentive systems efficient.
have proved the existence of a very high m otivational relationship between wages and workers' production. Under such conditions the employment of a straight piece-rate system, if possible, seems to be the best method of motivating labor. T o investigate these hypotheses, three com panies were chosen with one thing in common: the characteristics of their technological processes made the employ ment of such incentives rational and possible.
Thus, the relative levels of efficiency of the wage plans in the three organiza tions have been determined by compari son to a theoretically ideal one. T he results also have been checked by the relative levels of work discipline and work intensity, which are im portant, al though indirect, reflections of E.
In our approach to the set of socio economic factors influencing the com panies' behavior in the realization of the incentive program, we have tried to cover as large a sphere as we could. Among the large num ber of interacting and some times overlapping factors, we concen trated our attention on the following im portant ones: (1) relations of the com panies' management and labor force (intramanagement and management-la bor relations of powers, workers' atti tudes concerning production, etc.); (2) the economic positions of the companies (their market situation, production costs, technological efficiency, state subven tions, etc.); and (3) national restrictive measures (central control over wages per capita, the functioning of the profit-shar ing system, etc.). In our opinion, the efficiency of wage incentives and the relevant behavior of the companies have always been determined by a specific constellation of the above factors.
O ur methods of investigation included an analysis of documents and data from 770 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW the files of the companies, unstructured interviews, and case studies.
Incentive Systems of Different Efficiencies
A brief description of the three com panies follows. Company AA is situated in the mostly agricultural area of western Hungary; it has about 15,000 employees and manufactures railway coaches, tank wagons, differential gears, axles, steering gears, and chassis for trucks and buses. Company BB has its headquarters in the highly industrialized capital of the coun try; it employs about 5,000 people and produces several thousand types of med ical instruments. Company CC is also situated in the capital; it has about 700 workers and produces a special type of electrical instrument.
At Company A A, the construction of the incentive system, at least in principle, has been efficient. T he workers carry out their tasks mostly in groups and are paid directly on the basis of how much they produce (with the exception of a few departments). For the most part, there is neither a lower limit (guaranteed level) nor an upper limit (ceiling) for wages. T he management of the company, how ever, exercises strict control over piece rates. A series of piece-rate cuts (10.4 percent in 1964, 9.4 percent in 1965, 6.9 percent in 1966, 19.5 percent in 1969, etc.) seems to have served the purpose of keeping production standards stable. In general, the functioning of the incentive system has been a success for the past few years, although a num ber of workers have carried out cyclical slowdowns from time to time, and the ratio of labor turn over has been rather high. T he negative symptoms have been primarily due to the practice of "constant" piece-rate cuts, which usually have led to restriction of production and other expressions of worker dissatisfaction. In addition, the wage-restricting measures of the company often have lacked a proper basis; they have not been justified by improvements in technology or organization, and they have been directed toward increasing work intensity-at "sweating the peo ple," as the workers put it.
Company BB has preferred a rather irrational type of piece-rate system. Al though it is an inherent requirem ent of motivation to give workers proper possi bilities of maximizing production in order to earn maximum money rewards, the management of this company has done just the opposite. It established a lower guaranteed level of wages and pro duction at 80 percent and also intro duced an upper limit or degressivity plus upper limit of 100 or 110 percent. Piece rates have been extremely loose for the past decade, and management made the first vague steps to revise them only in 1970, after the beginning of our investi gation. T he pseudohum anitarian slogan enunciated by management was "a ceil ing on earnings had to be established to defend the workers against themselves, since some workers, in search for profits, were ready to endanger even their own health." But at the same time the m an agement admitted, "conditions are far from being satisfactory in the control of piece rate. At present there is no central organ in the firm that could improve the level of production or standards that are usually very loose, although varying in their level from unit to unit." Poor management naturally results in poor work discipline. A considerable part of working hours has been spent in idle con versation, lunches, and cigarette breaks; and there has been a general practice among workers of making various articles for their own household use. Although these practices have been disapproved of by management, disciplinary measures have been rarely and only reluctantly taken against them.
Company CC has rejected use of a piece-rate system, it has preferred day pay. As a result, work intensity has been lower than at Company AA, but it has remained higher than at Company BB. Workers work at moderate speeds, and discipline has been acceptable. Sharp conflicts have been rare, and the rate of labor turnover has been more favorable than at either of the other two factories.
After having examined the efficiency of payment systems at the three com panies, we have come to the following conclusions. Despite the homogeneous aim of the new economic model, there exists a variety of wage plans at stateowned companies, ranging in their effi ciency from high to very low. There seems to be a general tendency for re stricting the level of wages (by cyclical and radical cuts of piece rates at Com pany AA, by the establishment of a ceil ing on earnings at Company BB, and by the preference of day pay at Company CC).
Labor-Management Relations T he introduction and functioning of an incentive system is basically deter mined by the relations of management and labor and by the intramanagement and management-labor power play with in an economic organization. In H unga ry, the leadership of an economic organ ization consists of the leaders of three different organizations: the company, the trade union, and the party organization. All of them have formal rights to influ ence decisions, although the majority of such rights naturally belongs to the com pany.
The leaders of Companies A A and CC have had the capacity for building an efficient incentive model. At Company A A the general manager, an autocratic leader, has strict control over the tech nical-economic administration, a situa tion which gives him power that cannot be counterbalanced by the trade union or the party. As he put it, he is "shaking the chairs of his departm ent heads all the time, so that the people cannot fall asleep in them." Company AA is con sidered one of the best organized enter prises in the country. In its traditional departments rationalization of the work process has reached a high level: work groups are maximally specialized, their activities are harmonized, and insufficien cies in the supply of work duties and material and in the maintenance of tools and equipm ent are practically unknown. T he workers have only one duty-to in crease production. In its newly estab lished departments, the company em ploys the most up-to-date methods of programming production. Its personnel departm ent, dealing with labor and wages, is also high above the national standards in its level of efficiency. Its scientific-management-oriented e x p e rts have worked out the best possible m eth ods for the motivation of workers, radi cally substituting new incentive methods for older ones.
At Company CC, on the other hand, the leadership seems to be more demo cratic, but also efficient. T he general manager, the heads of the trade union, and party executives make their decisions in close cooperation: there are no rival ries in the "triangle," and the technicaleconomic administration follows the pol icy of the collective leadership as closely as it does at Company AA. T he schedul ing of jobs, supply of material, and maintenance of tools are good.
Company BB, in contrast to the other two enterprises, has a divided leadership.
T he general manager and his deputy are rivals in controlling the technical-eco nomic administration, and both look for the support of either the trade union or the party. Under such conditions of in ternal conflict, management cannot make supervisors follow its master plan, if indeed there is one. Efficiency is poor. T he degree of specialization in and the coordination of the work process are un satisfactory. Workers are not supplied with the proper am ount of job assign ments; there are chronic stoppages in the supply of materials; and maintenance of tools has been inadequate. According to the records of foremen, in 1967 there were about sixty days when the majority of workers could not work because of lack of material. T he personnel depart ment, dealing with labor and wages, can not cope with the problems it faces, as indicated by the looseness of piece rates mentioned above.4
T he quality of management is im por tant in the introduction of an incentive system, since management must overcome serious difficulties. T he level of inherited piece rates has been terribly loose in most companies. In the 1950s the level of wages had been linked by central regula tions to the am ount of production. The companies could increase it only if pro duction indices (percentages) increased. Thus to get more money to pay workers, managers postponed or completely ne glected necessary piece-rate cuts.5
T he negative results of the above prac tice have been eliminated by continuous 'Perhaps it is w orthw hile to m ention th at the continuation of the Stakhanovist m ovem ent and work com petitions of the 1950s were underm ined, am ong other things, by the m anagers' incapacity to ensure proper environm ent, continuous supply of duties and m aterial, etc.
"T his was one of the reasons for the fact th at Stakhanovists could sometimes reach such fan tastic production results as 1,800-2,000 percent. piece-rate cuts at Company AA and the abolishment of the piece-rate system at Company CC. However, the piece-rate system with its drawbacks continues at Company BB.
Characteristics of the Labor Force T he quality of labor also shows signif icant differences at the three companies, influencing the workers' responses to money incentives.
Company A A, as mentioned earlier, is situated in the center of an agricultural area experiencing rapid progress in in dustrialization. Its employees are mostly agricultural in origin, living in villages nearby. They are hardworking people, ready to make extra efforts for extra money and aim their activities at maxi mizing their earnings. In the tradition of the Hungarian peasant's style of life, "rate-busters" are not rare among them. T heir behavior also is motivated by the fact that wages mean their most impor tant source of income; their out-of-factory activities to earn money are negli gible.
Companies BB and CC, on the other hand, are situated in the capital, and their manpower is primarily of industrial origin. T he traditions of their industrial past have made these people less respon sive to money incentives. Moreover, in the large industrial area of the capital, services are inadequate and repair work is always in demand, netting such work ers (sheet-metal workers, electricians, me chanics, etc.) considerable additional (although generally illegal) income.
Geography thus plays an im portant role in the quality of both management and labor. In addition to the effects noted above, we must m ention that the relationship of supply and demand in the labor market is more favorable for Com pany AA than for the other two enter prises. In the rural areas there are only a limited num ber of jobs, but in the capital, employees have unlim ited possi bilities to change jobs.
T he situation in the capital has also been aggravated by a reversal in the flow of manpower. In the 1950s, labor was pumped from agriculture into industry, from the most remote parts of the coun try to the capital. In the 1960s, after industrialization had been accelerated in the rural areas, and the agricultural co operatives had been stabilized, many people left Budapest and went back to their villages. Companies in the capital have suffered because of this migration, while it has benefitted factories in the country. T hus the managers of Company AA have held a stronger position of power in relation to labor than managers in the capital.
Other management power relation ships have also been affected by location of the enterprise. In a country town the general manager of a large factory is always a key figure in local government. General managers in the capital, on the other hand, are relatively m inor figures on the chessboard, since the capital is headquarters for many large enterprises and all national institutions. T he quality of management and labor and power relationships throw much light on the problems discussed, but a great part of the companies' behavior still remains obscure. Why has Company AA carried out constant piece-rate cuts, "sweating" its labor, provoking serious internal con flicts, and often making its incentive system counterproductive? How could Company BB exist with such internal conditions, if efficiency were nationally stressed and profits represented as its main indicator? Why has Company CC rejected the piece-rate system, despite favorable technological and organization al characteristics and the relatively strong position of its management?
T he Companies' Economic Position T he factors discussed above have cre ated possibilities for managers to act to reform their incentive systems or have prevented them from doing so. But they have not motivated them. Motivation has been provided by profit incentives (an issue to be discussed later) and by the overall economic position of the enterprises.
On the basis of various macro condi tions, the managements of the three companies have been subjected to pres sures of varying force in their search for profits and efficiency. T he question is whether outside influences have been able to outweigh the managers' reluc tance to upset the existing relations of interests and powers within their organ izations by reforming wage incentives and changing the financial positions of groups, thus possibly provoking serious conflicts.
T he management of Company AA has been forced, by the nature of its products, to use prices in the international market as a guide and has tried to choose a profit-maximizing package in its production-possibility set. T he decision was made to cease m anufacturing railway coaches and undertake production of heavy-duty diesel engines for buses and trucks. T he company's technology was too antiquated to make railway coach m anufacturing profitable, and state sub sidies were being withdrawn. In addi tion, demand for coaches was limited, and several other companies produced them under more favorable technological circumstances. However, immediate ces sation of production was not possible; withdrawal took the form of gradual re duction of output. Accordingly, manage m ent felt that cuts in production costs were necessary. Since investment in new equipment was not indicated under the circumstances, it decided to reduce labor costs. T he m ethod selected was to en courage workers to make more intensive efforts by the help of a radical piece-rate system. This has been a difficult pro cedure for these managers to follow, since they have had to confront the natural resistance of workers, but they have had no other choice.
Company BB has been in a more favor able position. Although the scheduling of jobs, the maintenance of tools, the supply of material, and the technology are all inadequate-that is, the entire production operation should be unprofit able, according to the standards of the international market-the company can still attain rather high profits. This has been possible primarily because of its monopolistic position in the home m ar ket and control over prices. Second, its products (medical instruments) are con sidered to be of "great necessity for the country," and it therefore enjoys large state subsidies. Consequently, manage ment has taken few steps toward ration alization of the work process and has not been hasty in establishing radical wage incentives for the workers. It has been engaged more in "m anipulating" profits than in increasing efficiency. Manage m ent's lack of interest in efficiency has been an im portant factor in the creation of the distorted form of a piece-rate sys tem with its upper ceiling on earnings. T he established lower limit (guaranteed level), on the other hand, has served as a defense of the workers against the likely negative effects on earnings of insuffi ciencies in the supply of m aterial and of poor maintenance. It has provided a comfortable position for the leadership of the company.8
Company CC's position in the home market is also a monopolistic one, and it can sell its products (special electrical equipment) on favorable terms in the world market as well. Also, fixed prices have been set for them in the home m ar ket. T he company is relatively new, wellorganized, and equipped with modern means of production, thus ensuring high efficiency even at a medium level of work intensity and discipline. T he manage ment has not been interested in motivat ing labor more radically; rather, it has concentrated on innovations in technol ogy, on sales, on more favorable market terms, etc.
T he economic position of the com panies, as an im portant factor in motivat ing managers to introduce efficient in centives for labor, however, cannot be discussed separately from the role of certain restrictive measures by the na tional government.
Government Restrictions
T he government has urged the intro duction of efficient wage incentives, but at the same time, by its restrictive regula tions, has made realization of this goal difficult, sometimes practically impossible.
T he central agencies have strict con trol over wages per capita at all stateowned companies and have set them on a roughly uniform level in all factories. T he aim is to avoid certain possible negative by-products of the new economic model: first of all, the possibility of job lessness. Joblessness is unknown in H un gary, but a price is paid in low output per worker. Central control over per capita wages prevents companies from "Internal clashes and rivalries in m anagem ent do not seem unrelated to this "com fortable" position.
employing smaller well-paid work forces stimulated by adequate wage differen tials. Instead managers are required to employ larger medium-paid work forces which are not properly motivated. If a company wants to increase production, it cannot pay extra money to its (often idle) workers but instead must look for addi tional manpower.
T he trade union, because of its heri tage and present structure, cannot under take the task of protecting the workers. It has united all sorts of employees in its ranks and leadership, from m anual work ers to middle and top management. It has no clearly outlined goals, based on realistic considerations of the present relations of interests and powers within the companies. T he necessary national "centralization" of the defense of work ers' interests is one of the main contrib utors to the present state of wages.
According to the central regulations, even a very slight increase in wages per capita is very heavily taxed: it has to be covered by the share of profits to be turned into incentive bonuses. But this part of the profit is usually so low that the sum spent on wage increases (extract ing all profits from managers) can have only negligible results, and any further increase can make the company "bank rupt." For example, at Company AA, the share of profits to be divided in 1968 meant a ten-days' pay for the workers and about forty-days' pay for the m an agers. Thus the companies that have to achieve their growing production targets must invest in technical equipment, im prove their organization, and attract additional manpower, resulting in a large artificial demand for workers in the labor market. In addition, the flourishing agri cultural and industrial cooperatives, which have remained untouched by cen tral measures of wage restriction, have produced a demand for workers. Thus a curious situation has developed. T he large state-owned companies, often wellequipped, well-organized, and highly productive, cannot rival the small, poorly equipped, poorly organized enterprises in the labor market. T he best skilled workers depart from the factories and take jobs at the cooperatives that can pay often twice as much as big companies.
T o avoid misunderstanding, it must be m entioned that the financial situation of the state-owned companies, in general, is not worse than that of the cooperatives. They can offer several conveniences to the employees, which cooperatives cannot (i.e., workmen's hostels, re s ta u ra n ts , washing rooms, sports fields, etc.). But workers seem to be much more interested in obtaining income directly in wages than indirectly through benefits.
T he big companies, tied by regulations and at the same time pressed by the high rate of labor turnover, desperately try to cope with the situation. They work out various (often illegal) solutions to break through the fixed level of wages, but these efforts usually fail. T he companies may increase m inim um wages, but at the same time (the average being fixed), they have to decrease maximum wages. As a result, the scale of wage differentials be comes even narrower; this hurts the skilled workers, and the lack of proper wage differentials undermines the func tioning of the wage plan. Under such conditions no wage plan can work effi ciently.
Management's Dilemma T he contradiction between manage m ent's desperate efforts to stimulate labor and its need to m aintain the fixed level of wages per capita is best manifest ed in the case of Company A A. This contradictory policy contributes to the inconsistent features of the company's incentive measures and to the practice of constant and usually unjustified piecerate cuts. T he same frustration of the fixed level of wages also has contributed to the existence of the pseudoefficient wage plan of Company BB (with a ceil ing on earnings) and to the complete re jection of a piece-rate system by Com pany CC.
In economic terms, the centrally set level of wages per capita fluctuates around the "minimum shutdown point" and "maximum shutdown point" at the same time. It fails to attract labor, but it increases the risk of the company becom ing "bankrupt."
Of course, shutdown in a centrally planned model cannot be understood in its original sense. T he breaking of central regulations endangers not so much profits as the position of managers, who (if they can do so, as in the case of Companies BB and CC) refrain from the hopeless effort of building up a really efficient wage plan for labor.
T he crucial question is, why do the central agencies set wages per capita on roughly the same level at all engineering companies; why is the share of profits to be divided so low?
It is obvious that the establishment of proper wage differentials among the workers requires, because of the inherent logic of the system, proper differentiation of the level of wages per capita among the companies as well.
Wage differences in labor must be based, in principle, on the work done. Differences between the wage levels of companies theoretically must be based on efficiency. But the trouble is that effi ciency (resulting not so much from the activities of managers and workers but from the past arbitrary decisions of cen tral organs) has to be, at least for the moment, excluded from consideration.7 But no other reliable indicator exists. T hat is why the sum of incentive bonuses from profits also has had to be limited. Furthermore, that is why the managers' incentive bonuses have not been consis tent with the companies' production and profit achievements and have been kept small, giving little incentive to managers who have usually endeavored to score only "relatively good," "acceptable," or "generally satisfactory" results. T he pres ent obstacles to increased efficiency, the insufficiencies of money incentives, the unreliability of a profit indicator, the fear of social injustices and conflicts, the re strictive measures on wages and profits to be divided, in a sense, seem to create a vicious circle, the breaking of which is an enormous task for the future.
Thus, even if managers sought an optimum solution in wage incentives, it could not result in an efficient system. But as managers naturally have sought only a satisfying, acceptable solution, the efficiency of wage plans has become even worse.
Conclusions On the basis of the limited survey re ported here, we are unable to analyze the effects of the new decentralized economic model on the behavior of managers and T h is practice naturally discourages the m an agers of the best companies. One of them told us, "W e p ut different sums of money into the common pool, and we have to take out equal ones from it." T his problem is com pounded by the other difficulties resulting from the necessary cooperation of more and less efficient enterprises. C om pany AA is in a relatively favorable position, because it has developed into a large vertical factory, having its own m etallurgical departm ent, etc., b ut the work of other com panies is often thw arted by late deliveries of com ponents or deliveries in poor condition. Com pany BB, in th at respect, is in the worst position since it m anufactures several thousand types of products putting it in a jungle of cooperational diffi culties.
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business organizations in general.8 We have omitted several im portant areas of company activity (investments, trading, financial transactions), so we might focus our attention on the relatively narrow problem of the introduction of efficient incentive systems. A few observations on the overall operation of the reform may be offered. During the first two years of the new economic model, the central regulations could not adapt themselves flexibly enough to the different microand macro-socioeconomic circumstances of the various companies (technology, organization, internal power structure, market position, price policy, etc.). T he phenomenon is best manifested in the uniform level of wages per capita set for the companies. T he central regulations could not be adapted quickly enough to the constantly changing circumstances. The phenomenon is best indicated by the companies' wage level moving around the maximum and m inim um "shutdown points" at the same time. T he central regulations have not been coordinated properly (as in the case of wage control over state-owned companies and coopera tives).
In addition to the insufficiencies of central regulations, the heritage of the past, the level of the organization of work, backward technology, the back ward and sometimes unprofitable struc ture of products have also meant serious obstacles to the introduction of workable and productive wage plans, illustrating 8An analysis of the H ungarian economic re form has been recently com pleted by David Granick of the University of W isconsin for the International Developm ent Research C enter at Indiana University. T h e paper, from the econo mist's point of view, contributes significantly to the authors' argum ent in this article.
that the transition from a less efficient centralized model to a more efficient de centralized one is a long and painful process.
Our results have also shown that the establishment of proper incentives for managers is a serious problem even in the new model of the economy.
T he conflict of efficiency and humanitarianism seems to remain existent even in the decentralized economic model. T he central regulations have contributed greatly to the failure of wage incentives, although they have protected workers against joblessness and other possible negative effects of the acceleration of productivity. In this regard they are a success in the short run. In the long run, however, the present hum anitarian pref erences would seem to underm ine the efficiency which is the main guarantee for achieving the hum anitarian goals.
Radical changes in the economic sys tem of Hungary have to face serious natural obstacles because of the heritage of the past and the restraints of the pres ent. Critical restraints on progress in clude the rejection of the possibility of unemployment, rapid increases in con sumer prices, and the exclusion of any other form of pressure placed on impor tant social groups including labor and managers. But neither the heritage of the past nor the restraints of the present should become absolute; within the given limits there is possibility to make further steps forward. T o decrease the negative by-products of the decentralized model, it seems necessary to make central regu lations more differentiated, more flexible, more coordinated, and above all, scienti fically better founded on analysis of the functioning of economic organizations.
